Asymmetric impact of earnings news on investor uncertainty

We describe a model that predicts an asymmetric impact of disclosure on investor uncertainty. We show that good news tends to resolve more uncertainty than bad news, and that uncertainty can be revised upwards if the investors' prior belief is sufficiently strong and the signal is sufficiently bad. This result is in contrast to classical disclosure models, where new information always resolves uncertainty and the change in uncertainty depends only on the relative precision of the news. Using option-implied volatility as a proxy for uncertainty, we find strong support for our predictions. We also show that our results are robust to competing explanations, notably to the leverage effect and volatility feedback, as well as to the jump risk induced in anticipation of the earnings announcements.     

Vertical collusion

We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier—who are all equally patient (“vertical collusion”). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier's inability to commit to charging the monopoly wholesale price when retailers are differentiated. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme and rejects contract deviations. In the presence of competing suppliers, vertical collusion can be sustained using short-term exclusive dealing.     

Real earnings management around CEO turnovers

Following CEO turnovers, US firms adjust real business activities to manage earnings downwards (REM bath). This effect is most pronounced in firms with low levels of institutional ownership. REM baths early in CEOs’ tenure can be confounded with legitimate adjustments to business activities. However, we show that they are not accompanied by increases in R&D or capital expenses, nor are they explained by restructuring expenses. CEOs with short tenure record more negative REM measures in their first year of tenure, when compared with CEOs with long tenure.     

How much does tax erode fund excess returns?

We model the tax drag from active fund management based on reported monthly holdings of active equity funds. Tax drag erodes 65 percent of the 0.74 percent excess return in Broad Market funds, but only 21 percent of the 1.80 percent excess return in Small-Cap funds for Australian superannuation (pension) fund investors. Tax drag varies with investment style; market state, which is most detrimental during bull markets; and fund turnover. For high-income individual investors, tax drag is exacerbated to the extent that active management only generates meaningful after-tax excess return for Small-Cap funds of certain styles.     

Death spiral PIPEs: a reconsideration of the evidence

We challenge the view that PIPEs lead to unfavourable outcomes for issuing firms. We show that structured PIPEs do not have significant negative CARs when a matched firm benchmark is used for computing CARs and when sample selection bias is taken into account. Indeed, structured PIPEs have significantly higher positive skewness, indicating superior optionality, consistent with the real option argument. We also show that the 2002 intervention by the Securities and Exchange Corporation (SEC) has led to unintended consequences, with the substitution of ‘mom and pop’ investors for hedge fund investors in the structured PIPE market.     

Investors’ Limited Attention: Evidence from REITs

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper examines the degree to which the market prices of publicly traded firms reflect and respond to new information regarding the economic...     

LONGER‐RUN EFFECTS OF ANTI‐POVERTY POLICIES ON DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS

We assess evidence on the longer‐run effects of minimum wages, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and welfare on key economic indicators of economic self‐sufficiency in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The evidence suggests that the longer‐run effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit are to increase employment and to reduce poverty and public assistance. We also find some evidence consistent with higher welfare benefits having longer‐run adverse effects, and stronger evidence that tighter welfare time limits reduce poverty and public assistance in the longer‐run. The evidence on the longer‐run effects of the minimum wage on poverty and public assistance is not robust. (JEL J22, J23, J38)     

Share trading activity and the rise of the rentier in the UK before 1920*

Abstract

Using a hand-collected dataset, we examine share trading activity over the period 1882–1920 for the North British and Mercantile Insurance Company, one of the largest UK companies of the time. Our main finding is that the steady flow of rentiers into the shareholding constituency of this company stymied share trading activity. Another important finding is that share trading still occurred during the closure of the stock exchange in 1914, but on a much-reduced scale. We also find that there was a substantial boom in share trading and in insurance stock prices after World War I.     

The effect of investment and withdrawal horizons on myopic loss aversion

Using unique survey data, we find that a longer investment horizon (6–10 years and 11+ years) reduces the likelihood of exhibiting myopic loss aversion (MLA) compared to an investment horizon of less than 2 years. In addition, we find that investors with higher levels of assets under management (AUM) are less likely to exhibit MLA compared to the lowest AUM quartile.